Islamabad: The full report of the inquiry committee, constituted by Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif to investigate the fire incident at the PIMS nursery on August 26, has been released.
The report was issued under the directive of Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif; it reveals that out of 15 newborns present during the fire at the PIMS MCH nursery, 14 lost their lives, while one survived.
The inquiry committee examined not only the causes of the fire but also its grave consequences and the factors that led to the situation becoming catastrophic. The committee reviewed emergency response measures, arrangements for the evacuation of the infants, the determination of individual and institutional accountability, and necessary reforms; the committee’s findings and recommendations are based on a comprehensive 52-point investigation.
The investigation incorporated a review of forensic evidence, CCTV footage, call records, and engineering and maintenance documentation. The committee also utilized medical and incident records, duty and attendance logs, witness statements, regulatory records, and data from previous inquiries. Furthermore, CCTV footage confirmed the exceptionally rapid escalation of the emergency situation within the PIMS nursery.
According to the investigation report, the fire had clearly flared up by approximately 6:38:15, at which point frontline staff took immediate action. Charge Nurse Nasreen Akhtar, Security Guard Maria Saleem, and Staff Nurse Razia Noreen acted within moments to save the infants; Nurse Razia Noreen rescued one newborn and attempted to re-enter the nursery.
The report also notes that Dr. Muhammad Abdul Rehman was present at the scene when the fire broke out. By approximately 6:39:15, dense smoke had completely obscured the view of the CCTV camera; evidence refutes the general allegation that frontline staff abandoned the newborns, as multiple personnel took prompt and courageous action under dire circumstances.
The inquiry report states that, according to the most robust technical evidence from the National Forensic Agency, the most probable point of origin for the fire was the power cable of AC Unit No. 2 (located near AC Unit No. 1). Likely caused by localized overheating, overcurrent, high-resistance connections, or a localized electrical fault, the cable’s insulation was compromised, igniting nearby combustible materials.
According to the report, the evidence does not support theories of arson, ignition at multiple locations, an external electrical fault originating from IESCO, or an oxygen leak preceding the fire. There is also no evidence identifying an incubator or warmer as the source of the fire; the inquiry concludes that the most probable cause was an electrical fault.
The precise nature of the electrical fault and the identification of the individual or entity responsible for its prevention require separate determination. While maintenance records indicate that the nursery’s AC units had been serviced, there was no effective system for comprehensive electrical safety checks covering cables, terminations, insulation, earthing, and breaker protection. Crucially, the fact that electrical equipment was operational did not mean its electrical installation was entirely fire-safe.
According to the investigation report, evidence indicates a significant institutional gap between maintaining the functionality of equipment and ensuring its complete safety; the sensitive nature of the nursery environment further exacerbated the devastating impact of the fire.
Fifteen critically ill newborns were undergoing treatment in the 10-bed unit. Many relied on oxygen or respiratory support, making rapid relocation to a safe area impossible; only two doctors and two nurses were present at the time, and resources for a safe evacuation were severely limited.
The report states that no records were found regarding formally approved Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) for neonatal evacuation—procedures that should have been practiced by trained staff. There was no evidence of automatic smoke detectors, alarms, or sprinkler systems in the affected area, while the presence of flammable materials and an oxygen-rich environment vastly intensified the fire and smoke. Frontline staff took action within seconds of the fire breaking out.
The inquiry report notes that, according to CES records, the external notification (call for outside help) occurred at 06:54, dispatch at 06:55, and operational arrival at 07:01; consequently, the time lag between the fire’s onset at 06:38 and the activation of external assistance is deemed unacceptable.
PIMS failed to provide evidence of an established, tested Incident Command System capable of immediately activating alarms, external notifications, evacuation protocols, hazard mitigation, access management, and coordinated relief operations upon the detection of a fire.
The report states that the PIMS nursery tragedy occurred against the backdrop of known yet completely ignored hazards that required proactive measures from the hospital administration; previous correspondence from the CDA and recommendations by the Federal Ombudsman in 2015 had highlighted these deficiencies, and PIMS itself had acknowledged the outdated fire safety infrastructure.
Deficiencies regarding timely fire detection, alarms, electrical inspections, evacuation procedures, firefighting equipment, fire drills, and emergency planning had already been identified following the fire at the nursing hostel on July 6, 2026; however, prior warnings were not translated into a comprehensive, time-bound, and independently verified corrective program before the nursery tragedy.
According to the report, even if the specific fault in AC Unit No. 2 had not been identified beforehand, an integrated and robust system for effective fire safety.
